ABSTRACT Since the characteristics of opposite objectives, non-cooperation relationship, and dependent strategies of network attack and defense are highly consistent with game theory, researching the decision-making methods of network defense and applying the game models to analyze the network attack-defense behaviors has been of concern in recent years. However, most of the research achievements regarding to the game models are based on the hypothesis that both the two sides' players are completely rational, which is hard to meet. Therefore, we combined the evolutionary game theory and Markov decisionmaking process to construct a multi-stage Markov evolutionary game model for network attack-defense analysis, in view of the bounded rationality constraint. The model, based on the non-cooperative evolutionary game theory, could accomplish dynamic analysis and deduction for the multi-stage and multi-state network attack-defense process. In addition, an objective function with discounted total payoffs was designed by analyzing payoff characteristics of the multi-stage evolutionary game, which is more consistent with the reality of network attack and defense. Besides, the solving method for multi-stage game equilibrium was proposed on the basis of calculating the single-stage evolutionary game equilibrium. In addition, an algorithm for optimal defense strategy of the multi-stage evolutionary games was given. Finally, the experiments showed the high effectiveness and validity of the model and method that has a guiding significance for the network attack and defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the rapid development of the Internet has brought great changes to human life. Those changes also bring various challenges to cyberspace security. Therefore, enhancement of the defense capability for network security and improvement of the cyberspace security have been an urgent task for every country [1] . Exploring the defense technologies and the analysis methods has great guiding significance for the cyberspace security [2] , [3] . The network Attack-Defense process has the characteristics of opposite objectives, non-cooperation relationship and dependent strategies, which are the bases to game theory. Consequently, the game theory, which applied to analyze network AttackDefense process, has gradually become a new trend nowadays [4] . Some scholars have already obtained series of achievements. However, the current research methods are still not perfect enough since the research of cyberspace security based on game theory has developed for few years.
Lye [5] studied the methods of optimal defense strategy selection by using matrix game for the network AttackDefense process, which based on the behaviors analysis by complete information static game theory. Wang and Yu [6] proposed a method of optimal defense strategy selection by adopting static Bayesian game model, and designed an active algorithm of defense strategy selection, which improved the validity and the feasibility of strategy selection. Shiva et al. [7] proposed a holistic security approach and they found that game theory provides huge potential to place such an approach on a solid analytical setting. They considered the interaction between the attacks and the defense mechanisms as a game played between the attacker and the defender. Although this game model seems to be promising, it also faces new challenges which warrant future attention. The process of network attack and defense has the dynamic performance, which makes it difficult to satisfy the constraint that the players act simultaneously. Thus, the dynamic game theory is more consistent with the reality and the research achievements would have better practicability. Because the static game model has the deficiency that cannot describe the attack intentions and the changing process of attack strategies, thus an active defense model based on the dynamic game theory was proposed [8] . The authors gave two kinds of game algorithms for different network Attack-Defense situations: complete information and incomplete information. Besides, considering the effects of Attack-Defense behavior information in the game process, Yu and Han [9] constructed the network Attack-Defense signal game model. They studied defense strategy selection by analyzing perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Furthermore, Li [10] constructed multi-stage Attack-Defense signal game model, on the condition of bounded information, to research defense decision-making for the otherness of signal effects in different game stages. All the game models and methods in above achievements are on the premise of bounded rationality of players, whereas it is difficult to satisfy in the reality. In fact, the rationality of attacker and defender is limited and incomplete. Thus, the complete rationality of the players weakens the practicability and guiding significance of the achievements in the above literature [5] - [10] . Therefore, the effective game models and analysis methods with the characteristics of bounded rationality and dynamic process in network attack and defense are badly in need.
Evolutionary game theory, on premises of bounded rationality and asymmetric information, analyzes the evolution process by learning mechanism based on the idea of biological dynamic evolution, which is consistent with the characteristics of network attack and defense. Therefore, evolutionary game theory that applied to the information security field is gradually becoming the hotspot in academic field. Wang et al. [11] established evolutionary game model to analyze the network group behaviors, and a method that they introduced can be applied to evaluate the network group behaviors of stochastic evolution process. Zhu et al. [12] applied evolutionary game theory to analyze the process of network attack and defense. They utilized system dynamics to simulate the game model, and several effective suggestions were proposed for network security defense decisionmaking. Sun et al. [13] suggested using the security evaluation technologies based on the evolutionary game model to research the optimization configuration of information security. Liu and Ding [14] applied evolutionary game model to analyze the dynamic process of trust calculation. Besides, they analyzed the evolution trend of trust relationship among network nodes by using replicator dynamics. Nevertheless, in the actual network Attack-Defense process, the system states have certain randomness since the changes of Attack-Defense strategies or operation environment in system can lead to dynamic changing of system states. Thus, the models and methods above are not perfect enough to analyze the network Attack-Defense process.
In view of the dynamic evolution process of network Attack-Defense and the randomness of system states, some scholars combined Markov decision-making process and the game theory, which improved the practicality and feasibility of the model. Jiang et al. [15] formalized the defense strategy selection of network security and combined the matrix game model and Markov decision-making process. The authors proposed an Attack-Defense stochastic game model to describe the contradiction between network security attack and defense. Wang et al. [16] designed network Attack-Defense architecture by using stochastic game model, and a fast modeling method for analyzing network AttackDefense process was proposed. In addition, Wang et al. [17] established a Markov game model to analyze the network Attack-Defense behaviors and designed an algorithm to select optimal defense strategy. However, all the above literature [15] - [17] just combines the traditional matrix game and Markov decision-making process, which is difficult to satisfy the bounded rationality condition of both sides of attack and defense.
In this paper, we combine the actual network AttackDefense process and evolutionary game theory to construct multi-stage Markov Attack-Defense evolutionary game model on the condition of bounded rationality. Besides, we utilize the sum discount payoffs to design objective function, introduce discount factor to dispose the discount payoffs of different game stages in the network Attack-Defense process, and design an algorithm of optimal defense strategy selection on the basis of solving multi-stage evolutionary stable equilibrium. Finally, the simulation verifies the validity and feasibility of the model and method. Compare to the existing research achievements, the game model and method in this paper can be applied to analyze the dynamic process between attacker and defender more precisely, and the method to select optimal defense strategy has better practicability and guiding significance for network security.
II. MULTI-STAGE MARKOV ATTACK-DEFENSE EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL A. ANALYSIS OF MULTI-STAGE MARKOV ATTACK-DEFENSE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
The two-person matrix game [18] can be defined as follows: There are two players A and D. The player A has m pure strategies while the player D has n pure strategies. On any one for the game, if A uses the ith pure strategy and D uses the jth pure strategy, there is a payoff of a ij to A and payoff of b ij to D. Denote by A and D the m by n matrices whose (i, j)-elements are a ij and b ij , respectively. The game is completely specified when the pay off matrices A and D are given.
We can easily find that the two-person matrix game is consistent with the process of network attack and defense, because the attackers and defenders are really distinct.
Evolutionary game theory [19] , on the condition of the bounded rational players, has been developing rapidly and using widely in fields of biology, sociology and economics, which researches group behaviors in the evolution process. Since less rational requirements are needed in evolutionary games for the players, so that the evolutionary game models are more consistent with the reality. Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) [19] is the core of evolutionary games, which denotes the equilibrium strategy with real stability and strong predictive ability. It can be described as follows:
Assume that s and s are strategies of game G, where s = s. f (s, s ) represents the game payoff. If the game players choose the strategy s with arbitrary probability λ ∈ [0, 1] and satisfy f (s, λs +(1−λ)s) > f (s , λs +(1−λ)s), then the strategy s is evolutionary stable strategy, which indicates that the strategy s is strictly superior to the strategywhen the strategy s is invaded by s .
Evolutionary game model is a kind of analysis model with multi-agent interaction. It can describe the actual evolution process well because of the characteristics of bounded rationality and dynamic evolution process. The game system evolves from an initial state to a stable state through a dynamic evolution process. However, the evolutionary stable states of network system are lack of long-term stability or immutable, because the objectives, preferences and feasible strategy sets of both attacker and defender may be changed in the actual Attack-Defense game process. In addition, the system operation environment may also be changed, which makes it difficult to stay stable of the system evolutionary stable states. They would be broken, eventually, jump to a nonstable new state and start the next evolution stage. Therefore, the multi-stage evolutionary game model is more suitable to describe and analyze the dynamic evolution process of network attack and defense.
Generally, the incomplete information game models of network attack and defense have the incomplete information restriction. It is difficult for the game players to grasp opponents' strategies preference, decision execution payoffs and game environment. Therefore, in this paper, the states transition between different evolution stages is described as a stochastic process. Besides, we combine Markov decision-making process with multi-stage evolutionary game model to construct multi-stage Markov evolutionary game model to analyze the network Attack-Defense process.
The dynamic evolutionary process is shown in Fig. 1 . The number of stages on game evolution makes the AttackDefense process can evolve over time which is not limited by the single stage. The multi-stage evolution model is more consistent with the reality of the network attack and defense.
In the network of Attack-Defense process, players can optimize their strategies and improve their game payoffs by learning from others on the assumption of bounded rationality, which belongs to a multi-state evolution process. In a certain period, the network Attack-Defense system would reach a stable equilibrium state. However, it is difficult for the state to be maintained. Eventually, the stable equilibrium state would be destroyed due to the change of game elements and system environment. The network system state may jump from a stable state to a non-stable with probability η, which makes the system start the next evolution stage. Consequently, the system state is in a dynamic cyclic process of ''Evolve-Jump-Evolve''.
B. SINGLE-STAGE ATTACK-DEFENSE EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL
Since multi-stage Attack-Defense evolutionary game model is composed of several independent similar single-stage evolutionary games, thus, we analyze the single-stage evolutionary game model firstly. denotes the probability of selecting attack strategy AS i VOLUME 5, 2017 and q j denotes the probability of selecting defense strategy DS j .
denotes the payoff function of defender and U A denotes the payoff function of attacker. The game payoffs of players determined by strategies both attacker and defender. At the different stages of game process, the adopted probabilities of defense strategies are different. Similarly, the adopted probabilities of attack strategies by attacker are different. The probabilities under the effect of the learning mechanism are changing over time, which forms a dynamic process of Attack-Defense strategy selection. 
The m by n matrices whose (i, j)-elements are a ij and b ij , respectively, has great importance to attacker and defender. It is related both to the attack strategies and defense strategies which is consistent with the character of dependent strategies.
Based on the conditions above, the expected payoff and average payoff U D for different defense strategies can be calculated by following equations:
The players who have lower revenue would learn the strategies from players who have higher revenue. The probabilities of selecting different defense strategies change with time that q i (t) denotes the proportion of selecting defense strategy DS i , which satisfies
Therefore, for arbitrary defense strategy DS i , the proportion of selecting this strategy is a function of time. The dynamic change rate can be denoted by replicator dynamic equation [20] as follow
Similarly, for arbitrary attack strategy AS i , the proportion of selecting this strategy changes dynamically over time
For arbitrary optional attack strategy, here is the corresponding replicator dynamic equation
In view of the above two replicator dynamic equations (3)(4), let, and the network Attack-Defense evolutionary game equilibrium point would be obtained by solving the equations.
C. MULTI-STAGE MARKOV ATTACK-DEFENSE EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL
Definition 2: Multi-stage Markov Attack-Defense Evolutionary Game Model can be expressed as an eight-tuple,
is the space of evolutionary game players, where N D denotes defender and N A denotes attacker. (2) T is the total number of stages of the game, and the current game stage process is denoted by G(k), which
strategy set of attacker, and AS i k represents optional strategy of attacker in the kth evolution stage; DS = {DS j k |1 ≤ k ≤ T , 1 ≤ j ≤ n } represents optional strategy set of defender, and DS j k represents optional strategy of defender in the kth evolution stage. (4) ξ is the discount factor, which represents the discounted ratio of the payoff in the kth stage compared to the initial stage, 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1.
} is the initial security state set of the system in the Attack-Defense process. (6) S = {S 1 · · · S k · · · S T } is the security state set of the system in the Attack-Defense process. The state of the set S 0 and S correspond to each stage of the game, that is, initial state S k 0 in a game stage evolves over a period and finally reaches the state S k . (7) η denotes transition probability of the system states, where η ij = η(S i |S j ) represents the probability of the system jumping from state S i to S j . The value of the transition probabilities depends on the strategies and network environment of attack and defense, such as network configuration, operating system environment of nodes and so on.
is the payoff function set of the games.
U k D and U k A represent payoff functions of attacker and defender in the kth game stage respectively. The game payoffs of attacker and defender are determined by the strategies chosen by all players in the game process, which are affected by the security states. We can judge the performance of Attack-Defense strategies from designing objective criteria function R. Discount expected return criterion function and average return criterion function are the objective criteria functions used commonly [21] . Since game payoffs are related to the time, this paper introduces the discount factor and adopts the discount expected criterion function to calculate the result, namely
It can be seen that the objective criterion function is the sum of the payoffs in the current game stage U A , U D and the future discount payoffs
. According to the above definition, network Attack-Defense process has T evolution stages. To maximize their objective functions are the eventual goals of both sides of attack and defense, respectively. The equilibrium existence and specific algorithm of the model M 2 ADE will be given in the next section.
III. ATTACK-DEFENSE EVOLUTIONARY GAME EQUILIBRIUM A. ANALYSIS OF GAME EQUILIBRIUM
In the process of network attack and defense, both sides of attacker and defender will maximize their payoffs. In view of multi-stage Markov Attack-Defense evolutionary game model M 2 ADE, the strategy sets of attacker and defender are
According to the theorem of evolutionary game equilibrium [19] , if is the evolutionary stable strategy for the kth stage, then for arbitrary Attack-Defense strategies DS i k , AS j k are satisfied with the following conditions
According to the multi-stage Markov evolutionary game process researched in this paper, the process of network attack and defense is composed of multiple sub-game processes and each state is affected by the strategies and payoffs of the previous stage of evolutionary game. Furthermore, the players must have a Markov Optimal response strategy based on the Markov decision-making criterion [22] . Therefore, if 
M 2 ADE belongs to a multi-state, multi-agent and finite Markov evolutionary game model, because the process of network attack and defense is composed of finite k stages evolutionary game. Besides, the attacker and defender have the finite Attack-Defense strategy sets
stage of the evolutionary game process. According to the basic theory of the evolutionary game and the conclusions in the literature [23] , [24] , it can be proved that the equilibrium strategy of multi-stage Markov evolutionary game model exists.
Theorem 1: Multi-stage Markov Attack-Defense evolutionary game model (M 2 ADE) exists mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Since M 2 ADE is composed of a number of independent and similar single-stage evolutionary game, and each independent single-stage evolutionary game is a finite game, then there must exist mixed strategy-Nash equilibrium [19] . According to the definition of the multi-stage Markov evolutionary game model, we can know that a finite stochastic game corresponds to M 2 ADE with the transition probabilities and payoff functions, and the payoff is a concave function. From the existence theorem of the equilibrium strategy of the finite stochastic game [23] , [24] , it can be seen that this finite stochastic game has mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Then, the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in M 2 ADE is proved.
B. SOLUTION FOR GAME EQUILIBRIUM 1) SINGLE-STAGE EVOLUTIONARY GAME EQUILIBRIUM
For each stage of network attack and defense, the evolutionary game equilibrium can be solved by the same approach. The solution process and steps of the single-stage evolutionary game equilibrium are described as follows:
(1) Establish the inference probabilities for optional strategies of attacker and defender. (2) Calculate the replicator dynamic equations of attacker and defender. The expected payoffs and average payoffs of different attack strategies can be calculated by VOLUME 5, 2017 following equations
Then, the replicator dynamic equation of attacker can be obtained as follow
Similarly, the defender will get the same as follows
(3) Calculate the evolutionary stable equilibrium.
Finally, the replicator dynamic evolution equations of attacker and defender can be obtained
, and the evolutionary stable equilibrium can be obtained by calculation. By analyzing the above calculation process, we could find that the time complexity of step 1, 2 is O(m + n), with the third step O((m + n) 2 ). In summary, the time complexity of the algorithm of solving evolutionary stable equilibrium does not exceed O((m + n) 2 ). Storage of strategies benefits and intermediate value in the equilibrium mainly consist storage space consumption. The space complexity of the algorithm is O(nm).
For the process and steps of solving the single-stage evolutionary game model, we can present it by an example in detail, seeing from appendix.
2) MULTI-STAGE EVOLUTIONARY GAME EQUILIBRIUM
The evolutionary game model of network attack and defense constructed in this paper contains multiple sub-game processes. Since there are many changes in the evolution process which causes the payoffs of future stages different. On the condition of the actual network attack and defense, the whole payoff of the evolutionary game can be obtained. Thus, on the basis of the single-stage evolutionary game equilibrium solution in the section a, we introduce the discount factor ξ for the payoff calculation of the multi-stage Attack-Defense processes to convert the future payoff to the initial stage. On this basis, we transform the issue of solving the multistage equilibrium strategy into a dynamic programming with the goal of highest payoff for the whole game. There are several conditions that the sum of the probabilities for selecting different attack strategies and different defense strategies should be one. Besides, the rates of change for the AttackDefense strategy should be zero when the evolution process attains the balance.
Where, D k (q i ) denotes replicator dynamic equation of defender and A k (p i ) denotes replicator dynamic equation of attacker at kth game stage, respectively. q k j denotes the probability of selecting strategy DS k j and p k i denotes the probability of selecting strategy AS k i . The optimal solution (DS * k , AS * k ) of the dynamic programming could be obtained by solving the programming. (DS * k , AS * k ) is the equilibrium strategy of the multi-stage evolutionary game. According to the game theory, the mixed strategy (DS * k , AS * k ) is the optimal choice for both attacker and defender. Therefore, defense strategy DS * k has the optimal effect and the defender should regard it as the optimal defense strategy.
C. ALGORITHM FOR MARKOV OPTIMAL DEFENSE STRATEGY SELECTION
On the basis of the multi-stage Markov evolutionary game model established in this paper, an optimal Markov defense decision-making algorithm has been designed and the Markov optimal defense strategy for the whole game process will be obtained eventually.
The time complexity of the algorithm is O(k(m + n) 2 ). The space complexity is O(nm) and the storage space consumption mainly focuses on the storage of strategies benefits and the intermediate values in the equilibrium. According to the algorithm, not only the single-stage evolutionary game equilibrium can be analyzed by changing states of singlestage strategies selection over time, but also the discount payoff of k stages can be obtained by discount criterion. Besides, the Markov decision-making criterion is applied to calculate the optimal defense strategy of the multi-stage Attack-Defense evolutionary game. The results can be used to analyze and predict the stable equilibrium of the AttackDefense evolution process.
Compare to the model and method with the existing research achievements, the comparison results are as shown in Table 1 .
In the literature [5] , [6] , the authors have established static game model to analyze the process of network attack and defense while the actual Attack-Defense process is dynamic. 11. Calculate the average payoff of attack strategy
Utilize the discount factor ξ to calculate the discount payoff
On the basis of the dynamic programming method in the section ćó, let the equations
as the objective functions, and the game equilibrium solution (DS * k , AS * k ) can be obtained by solving the equation (12). 14. Return (DS * k ); // Output the optimal defense strategy for each stage of attack and defense END In the literature [8] , [9] , a non-cooperative dynamic game model has been established on the assumption of complete rationality while it is difficult for the decision-makers to achieve the complete rationality in the real game. Then, the practicality of the models and methods are limited. In the literature [12] - [14] , the evolutionary game model under the bounded rationality condition has been established, which broke off the constraint of the complete rationality, but its evolution process can only be applied to the short-term analysis and prediction of network attack and defense. In the literature [15] - [17] , considering the stochastic jump of the game states caused by the adjustment of the Attack-Defense strategy, the authors combined it with Markov decision-making process to construct multi-agent and multi-state Markov game model.
However, these models belong to the superposition of multiple matrix game models, which have the premise of complete rationality for the players. In this paper, the model and method are more in line with the actual network Attack-Defense process.
IV. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS

A. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT DESCRIPTION
For the proposed multi-stage Markov evolutionary game model and the relative solution methods, we established a typical information system to verify the experiment as shown in Fig. 3 . The system mainly consists of security defense equipment, Web server, file server, database server 
B. SIMULATION
In network Attack-Defense process, the methods in the literature [26] , [27] are adopted to analyze the experimental system structure. In addition, this paper assumes that the whole network Attack-Defense process consists of eight evolution stages, and the specific states transition process of network Attack-Defense evolution is as shown in Fig. 4 . Where S k 0 is the initial state and S k is the evolution state. As shown in user permission to F1; S 6 0 : obtaining root access to C1 through the Web server; S 7 0 : obtaining access permission to C1; S 8 0 : obtaining user permission to C2}; S k = {S 1 : obtaining access permission to the Web server; S 2 : obtaining access permission to F2; S 3 : obtaining access permission to F1 through D1; S 4 : obtaining user permission to D1; S 5 : obtaining root access to F1; S 6 : obtaining root access to C2; S 7 : obtaining access permission to D2 through C1; S 8 : obtaining root access to F2}.
For the state transition between different evolution stages, this paper references the literature [26] , [27] , and we assume that the state transition probabilities are fixed. Furthermore, the values of state transition probabilities between stages are determined by the historical data and experts' experience, as shown in Table 2 . η ij = η(S j |S i ) represents the transition probability from state S i to S j in the evolution system.
According to the access control rules, the hosts out of the network can visit the Web server only. The Web server and application server in the system have access permissions to data server. In the experiment, the routing file and vulnerability information are analyzed [10] , [15] to construct the Attack-Defense strategy sets in each game stage through scanning the experimental system by Nessus, based on the contents of CNNVD [17] . As shown in Table 3 .
For each pair of Attack-Defense strategies {AS i , DS j }, the Attack-Defense payoff matrix of each evolution stage is shown in Table 4 , with reference to the strategy profit calculation method in the literature [5] , [9] , [15] .
In the experiment, suppose the discount factor ξ = 0.5. The evolutionary equilibrium strategy of each stage can be calculated by Matlab2012 to accomplish the strategy selection algorithm in section III, as shown in Table 5 , in which DS * k is the optimal defense strategy in the stage k.
C. ANALYSIS
In view of the attack goals of file server F1, F2, attacker would accomplish the attack aims as long as they get the root access to the file server F1, F2. Based on the analysis of the simulations above, it can be found that there are two attack paths:
Where, the first path can get root access to the file server F2 and the second path can get root access to the file server F1.
Attack path 1:
In the first stage S 1 0 → S 1 , the optimal defense strategy is the mixed strategy DS * k=1 = {0.5, 0.5, 0}, and the defense payoff is −30.5. Table 3 shows the strategy sets of the attacker and defender.
In the second stage S 2 0 → S 2 , the system state jumps from S 1 to S 2 0 with the probability of η(2|1) = 0.8. The optimal defense strategy is the mixed strategy DS * k=2 = {0.45, 0.05, 0.5}, and the defense payoff is −20.4.
In the third stage S 8 0 → S 8 , the system state jumps from S 2 to S 8 0 with the probability of η(8|2) = 0.4. The optimal defense strategy is the mixed strategy DS * k=3 = {0.2, 0, 0.8}, and the defense payoff is −27.5.
Attack path 2:
In the second stage S 6 0 → S 6 , the system state jumps from S 1 to S 6 0 with the probability of η(6|1) = 0.6. The optimal defense strategy is the mixed strategy = {0.4, 0.6, 0}, and the defense payoff is −40.3.
In the third stage S 3 0 → S 3 , the system state jumps from S 6 to S 3 0 with the probability of η(3|6) = 0.8. The optimal defense strategy is the mixed strategy DS * k=3 = {0.4, 0.55, 0.05}, and the defense payoff is −43.2.
In the last stage S 5 0 → S 5 , the system state jumps from S 3 to S 5 0 with the probability of η(5|3) = 0.9. The optimal defense strategy is the mixed strategy DS * k=4 = {0.4, 0.5, 0.1}, and the defense payoff is −19.5.
Therefore, we can calculate the total Attack-Defense payoffs based on the two attack paths above, respectively. For the attack path 1, the total attack payoff is U 1 AZ = 79.1 and the total defense payoff is U 1 DZ = −78.4. For the attack path 2, the total attack payoff is U 2 AZ = 142.3 and the total defense payoff is U 2 DZ = −133.5. We could find that it satisfies
It is obvious that the path 1 is more in line with the requirements of the defender. Then, the defender should avoid the occurrence of the path 2 in order to obtain a higher defense payoff.
Comparing the two attack paths above, it can be seen that the two attack paths have the same initial evolution stage that the system state evolves from S 1 0 to S 1 . They have different evolution stages after the first stage that the path 1 jumps from the state S 1 to S 2 0 while the path 2 jumps from the state S 1 to S 6 0 . In order to reduce the probability of occurrence of path 2, we have to reduce the probability of the system jumping from state S 1 to S 6 0 . Then, the system state will be avoided jumping to S 6 0 which can improve the probability of occurrence of path 1.
Additionally, it is possible to reduce the probability of transition probabilities by adding new defense strategies or changing the system environment. For instance, after the initial evolution stage, the path 1 jumps to state S 2 0 while the path 2 jumps to S 6 0 . The two evolution paths have different attack strategy sets as seen in Table 4 . Therefore, the change of the strategy sets and the system environment can cause the states exchange. Then, in view of the attack strategy AS = {Oracle TNS Listener, Wu-Ftp Sockprintf, install SQL Listener program} in the state S 6 0 , the defender could utilize the approaches of dynamic adjustment in the Attack-Defense access port or add white list to change the access control rules. Besides, they could add new defense strategies to reduce the probability of the attack action, which could reduce the probability of jumping to the state S 6 0 . Eventually, the attack path 2 would be avoided.
Besides, since the eventual paths of network attack and defense are related to several parameters, there are some vaviations when some parameters are changed. Such as: AttackDefense strategies, transition probabilities and payoffs. The evolution path of network attack and defense will have a certain or great change in the actual.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have established the multi-stage Markov evolutionary game model of network attack and defense to research the problem of defense strategy selection. The main research works include:
(1) We combined evolutionary game model with Markov decision-making process to construct the multi-stage Markov evolutionary game model on the basis of analyzing the dynamic network Attack-Defense game process. The model could be adopted to analyze the multi-agent and multi-stage Attack-Defense behaviors. (2) We extended traditional single-stage evolutionary game model to multi-stage game model, because it is difficult to apply the traditional single-stage evolutionary game model to analyze the long-term network attack and defense. Besides, the multi-stage game process with the objective payoff functions was analyzed. (3) We defined the game equilibrium strategy for the multistage Attack-Defense game and proposed a calculation method to solve evolutionary equilibrium based on dynamic programming problem. In addition, we designed an algorithm for the multi-stage Markov optimal defense strategy selection. Finally, the simulations verify the feasibility and the veracity of the model and the method. Our works have certain guiding significance to make security defense decisions in the multi-stage dynamic AttackDefense process based on the condition of bounded rationality. The model and the method can provide supports to research the cyberspace security.
However, applying the game theory to the field of information security research is still in its infancy and there are few existing research achievements. Moreover, the model exists certain of subjectivity since the real security environment is extremely complex, and the attack probability, risk loss and other parameters are usually difficult to estimate. In addition, the state transition probabilities have a strong subjectivity because they are determined by the experience of experts. Therefore, to research the values of state transition probabilities accurately is our future work, thereby to enhance the accuracy and practicality of the evolutionary game model of network attack and defense.
